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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 09-2576 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT SCOTT, SR. a/k/a Big Rob 
 
                                         Robert D. Scott, Sr., Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Nos. 1-05-cr-00443-011, 1-07-cr-00292-001) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Yvette Kane 
__________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  BARRY, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
 
. 
(Filed:  June 29, 2011) 
 
__________ 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge
 
. 
 Robert Scott, Sr. pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to transport individuals with intent 
to engage in prostitution, coercing and enticing individuals to travel in interstate 
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commerce for prostitution, and interstate travel with intent to distribute proceeds of 
prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2421, 2422(a) and 1952(a).  He also 
pleaded guilty to two separate charges of interstate transportation of a minor with intent 
to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).  The District Court 
sentenced Scott to 274 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a fine 
of $3,000, and an assessment of $300.  
 Quoting from his brief, Scott raises the following issues on appeal.  
I.  Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea and in failing 
to re-colloquy Defendant prior to accepting his guilty plea as 
required by Fed.R.Crim. P. 11(b). 
 
II.  Whether the District Court erred in failing either to rule on 
a controverted issue of fact or to determine that a ruling was 
unnecessary as required by Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) and in failing to append such ruling to 
the copy of the PSR made available to the Bureau of Prisons. 
 
III.  Whether the District Court erred in determining 
Defendant’s Base Offense Level under U.S.S.G. §2A3.1 
rather than §2G1.1 where the offense did not involve criminal 
sexual abuse, attempted criminal sexual abuse, or assault with 
intent to commit criminal sexual abuse as defined at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2242. 
 
IV. Whether the District Court erred in determining the 
offense involved conduct described at 18 U.S.C. §2241(a) or 
(b) and in increasing Defendant’s Offense [sic] by four levels 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(1). 
 
V.  Whether the District Court erred in applying a two level 
increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(4)(B) for “serious 
bodily injury” where the offense did not involve conduct 
constituting criminal sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. §§2241 or 
2242. 
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VI.  Whether the District Court erred in enhancing 
Defendant’s sentence two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§3A1.1(b)(1) for vulnerable victim, where there was no 
evidence to suggest that the victims were unusually 
vulnerable. 
 
VII.  Whether the District Court erred in enhancing 
Defendant’s Offense Level by two levels pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. §3C1.1 where Defendant’s efforts to encourage a 
witness to tell the truth did not constitute obstruction of 
justice. 
 
VIII. Whether the District Court erred in assessing the 
Defendant three Criminal History Points under U.S.S.G. 
§4A1.1(a) for a 1991 Tennessee conviction that should have 
been included as relevant conduct for the instant offense 
under §1B1.3. 
 
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-3.  We will affirm. 
 With regard to Scott’s guilty plea, he asserts that he raised his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea before the District Court accepted it and that, as a result, the District Court 
was obliged to grant his motion.  In fact, the record establishes that the District Court 
accepted Scott’s guilty plea before any mention that Scott may file a motion to withdraw 
the plea.  Moreover, Scott did not file the motion until two weeks later.  Accordingly, it 
was Scott’s burden to assert a “fair and just reason” for the withdrawal.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 
11(d)(2)(B).  Essentially, Scott’s motion expressed second thoughts on whether he could 
receive a fair trial.  The District Court was within its discretion to regard this as an 
insufficient reason to grant his motion.  He also claims that he did not understand the 
implications of his plea.  However, the District Court conducted a thorough colloquy at 
the time that Scott changed his plea, belying this claim.  Nothing further was required.  
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As a result, we conclude that the District Court was within its discretion to deny Scott’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  
 Scott raises multiple challenges against the District Court’s cross-reference to U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A3.1 (2003) for the calculation of the base level 
offense, and the District Court’s application of enhancements pursuant to this section.  He 
first claims that his offense did not involve criminal sexual abuse, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241 or 2242, and that it was error to use the cross-reference to section 2A3.1. 
 Scott’s guilty plea to the conspiracy made all reasonably foreseeable acts of co-
conspirators relevant conduct.  The record is replete with evidence of brutality by both 
Scott and his co-conspirators towards the victims that they prostituted.  Scott wishes, 
however, to sever these brutal acts against the victims from any intent to prostitute them.  
Yet, the District Court properly concluded that Scott and his co-conspirators routinely 
lured minors and young women into prostitution, and then forced them to continue 
prostituting by creating an environment of fear and dependence through the use of threats 
of violence, actual violence, and various forms of manipulation against them.  On this 
broad base of evidence, it applied the cross-reference to section 2A3.1.  The District 
Court did not err.   
 He next challenges the District Court’s application of the four-level special 
offense characteristic, pursuant to section 2A3.1(b)(1), on the basis that it is double 
counting the same conduct used to apply the cross-reference.  We disagree.  The District 
Court properly applied the entire offense guideline after the cross-reference, consistent 
with section 1B1.5.   
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 Scott also claims that the District Court erred both by failing to rule on his 
objection to evidence of a particular victim’s injury and by using this evidence to apply 
the serious bodily injury enhancement, pursuant to section 2A3.1(b)(4).   Nonetheless, 
given the government’s evidence of multiple victims with broken bones, deep lacerations 
and concussions at the hands of Scott and co-conspirators, the District Court did not err in 
its factual findings regarding this enhancement. 
 We next conclude that Scott’s challenges to the vulnerable victim enhancement 
under section 3A1.1(b)(1) and the obstruction of justice enhancement under section 
3C1.1 are meritless.  Scott and his co-conspirators pursued girls as young as twelve years 
old and “lost girls,” a term that referred to minors who were from troubled circumstances, 
such as homelessness and/or severely unstable families.  The victims also included a girl 
with a cognitive impairment and another with a psychological disorder.  These conditions 
were not incidental to the victimization.  With regard to the obstruction of justice 
enhancement, the government proffered Scott’s own letters and the testimony of co-
conspirators that demonstrated witness tampering.  The District Court did not err by 
applying these enhancements.  
 Finally, Scott challenges the District Court’s assignment of three criminal history 
points for a 1991 conviction in Tennessee for the transportation of minors in interstate 
commerce for the purpose of prostitution.  We need not reach the merits of his claim.  
Scott’s guilty plea subjected him to a statutory maximum of 35 years, and his plea 
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agreement capped his sentence at 300 months.1
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence of the District 
Court.   
  Moreover, the District Court’s sentence 
of 274 months was well below both the statutory maximum and the plea agreement cap.  
Therefore, even if these points were mistakenly attributed to Scott, it was harmless 
because the error did not affect the District Court’s selection of the sentence imposed.  
See United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
                                              
1 The District Court’s Guidelines calculations resulted in an offense level of 43 and, 
regardless of the disputed criminal history points, Scott’s Guidelines range would not 
have changed.   
